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ESSAY
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
AMERICAN TORT JUDGMENTS IN
GERMANY
GERFRIED FisCHER*
INTRODUCTION
The United States is, at least from a European point of view,
but probably in its own eyes as well, the country of superlatives.
It is the richest country in the world. It has the greatest military
power and the most liberal constitution. Everything is bigger,
larger, or greater than in other parts of the world. There are ar-
eas, however, where this can be a problem, and the recognition of
United States court judgments is one of them, at least as far as
damage awards are concerned. The awards in the United States
are higher than in any other country known to me, far exceeding
the amounts of German judgments in tort cases. For instance, the
largest damage award for pain and suffering in Germany came to
about 500,000 DM (300,000 DM lump sum plus 500 DM as a
monthly rent),' yet multimillion-dollar awards for punitive dam-
* Professor of Law, Martin-Luther-Universitat Halle, Germany, Juristische
Fakultdt, Chair for Private Law, Conflict of Laws and Comparative Law. Referendar
1964, Oberlandesgericht Celle; LL.M. 1966, University of California, Berkeley; As-
sessor 1969, State of Niedersachsen; Dr. jur. 1973, University of Gbttingen; Visiting
Professor to Law Faculties at the Universities of Tiibingen, Mainz, Erlangen, Berlin.
The author wishes to acknowledge Robert Malatak for adding sources and Annette
Haselhoff for "polishing up his rusty English."
1 LG MUNCHEN I 19 0 10676/85 (1985), reprinted in SUsANNE HACKS ET AL.,
SCHMERZENSGELD 235 (15th ed. 1991); GERAINT HOWELLS, COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIA-
BILITY 140 (1993). "[F]inancial ceilings [for death or personal injury] are fixed at a
maximum in individual cases of either a lump sum of 500,000 DM or an annuity of
30,000 DM." Id.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:199
ages seem to be not at all uncommon in the United States.2 In
cases having contact with both jurisdictions, differences like this
invite or even provoke forum shopping3 on the one side and resist-
ance to judgment recognition on the other.
I. THE FIRST GERMAN CASE
In Germany, this resistance has been voiced by academicians
in legal journals for about ten years, as well as by practicing law-
yers, mainly those working for business clients or insurance com-
panies.' Especially in the field of products liability,5 German
manufacturers, as well as their insurers, have been afraid of the
high liability risks they incur when exporting to the United
2 Cf JOHN G. FLEMING, THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESS 1, 216, 235 (1988) (referring
to billion dollar settlements as result of mass accidents); James B. Sales & Kenneth B.
Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic that Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV.
1117, 1154 n.167 (1984); Cheryl Frank, Trends in Million-Dollar Verdicts, 70 A.B.A.
J. 52 (1984) (detailing increase in jury verdicts in personal injury, medical malprac-
tice and products liability cases); see infra note 18 and accompanying text.
3 FLEMING, supra note 2, at 125 n.101, 236; JAN KROPHOLLER, 1 HANDBUCH DES
INTERNATIONALEN ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHTS 260. See Gerber, infra note 5, at 745-47
(detailing ways governments "seek to protect their own interests and concepts of jus-
tice" by attempting to prevent or limit domestic discovery rules from taking effect).
See generally Donald R. Shemanski, Obtaining Evidence in the Federal Republic of
Germany: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention on German-American Judi-
cial Cooperation, 17 INT'L LAWYER 465 (1983) (discussing differences in American and
German evidentiary procedure and impact of Hague Evidence Convention on transna-
tional litigation); Martin Radvan, The Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters: Several Notes Concerning Its Scope, Methods
and Compulsion, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1031 (1984) (providing discussion con-
cerning application of provisions of Hague Evidence Convention).
4 Viggio Von Hfilsen, Produkthaftpflicht U.S. 1981 in RECHT DER INTERNATION-
ALEN WIRTSCHAFT ("RIW") 1, 9 (1982); Peter Hchst, Zur Versicherbarkeit von Punitive
Damages 13, 16 (1983) (VERSICHERUNGSRECHT) ("VersR"); Ernst C. Stiefel & Rolf
Stfirner, Die Vollstreckbarkeit US-Amerikanischer Schadensersatzurteile Exzessiver
H6he, VersR at 829, 833 (1987); Schiitze, Die Anerkennunq und Vollstreckbarer-
kldrung US-Amerikanischer Schadensersatzurteile in Produkthaftungssachen in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, reprinted in FESTSCHRIFr FOR HEINRICH NAGEL 392
(1987); B.S. MARKESINIS, A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION To THE GERMAN LAW OF
TORTS 8-9 (1990) (describing how German tort decisions reflect views of academics
and legal writers).
5 See generally PETER HOCHST, DIE U.S.-AMERIKANISCHE PRODUZENTENHAFTUNG,
passim (1986); JOACHIM ZEKOLL ZEKOLL, U.S.-AMERIKANISCHES PRODUKTHAFTPFLICH-
TRECHT VOR DEUTSCHEN GERICHTEN, passim (1987); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 681-89 (5th ed. 1984); FLEMING, supra note
2, at 56; David J. Gerber, Extraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural
Systems: Germany and the United States, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 745 (1986) (discussing
conflict between United States and Germany regarding application of discovery rules
to transnational products liability suits).
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States. Surprisingly, the problem has not reached the German
courts until very recently. The first decision of the Bundesgericht-
shof ("BGH"), the German Supreme Court, dates from June 1992.6
As a conflicts case, it was rather atypical because its origin was
not in international commerce or international tourist traffic, but
in the criminal conduct of a German immigrant naturalized in the
United States. He had been sentenced for sexual abuse of chil-
dren in the United States. One victim was a thirteen year-old boy
with whom he had masturbated on five occasions. This boy sued
him in a California court and won an award of $750,260, of which
only $260 were for past medical damages. Future medical dam-
ages were assessed at $150,000, pain and suffering and general
damages of that nature at $200,000, and exemplary and punitive
damages at $400,000. The defendant, after having been crimi-
nally sentenced, moved back to Germany, where he owned real
property.
Thereafter, the plaintiff turned to the German courts asking
for recognition and enforcement of the California award, which by
German standards was clearly excessive. Had the boy originally
sued in a German court, he would have been lucky to win more
than 100,000 DM, less than one-tenth of the American award.
Before reporting the extent to which the German Bundesgericht-
shof recognized the California judgment, I shall explain the rea-
sons for such big differences. Most of them may be well known to
those who are familiar with the tort law or civil procedure of Euro-
pean countries or with Professor Fleming's excellent book The
American Tort Process.7
II. DIFFERENCES IN SUBSTANTIVE TORT LAw AND LITIGATION
Some of these reasons can be traced to divergences in sub-
stantive tort law, but even more are due to fundamental differ-
ences between tort litigation in the United States and in Ger-
many, as well as in most other European countries.8
6 BGH vom 4.6.1992 - IX ZR 149/91, NJW 1992, 3096.
7 See supra note 2.
8 See FLEUNG, supra note 2, passim; see generally Benjamin Kaplan et al., Phases
of German Civil Procedure I, 71 HIv. L. REv. 1193 (1958) (providing general exposi-
tion on nature of German civil procedure and litigation as compared to American
system).
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A. Differences in Substantive Tort Law
As for substantive law, the most important difference proba-
bly originates from the reluctance of German law to allow the im-
position of punitive damages. 9 The primary purpose of German
tort liability is compensation;1 ° whereas, punishment and deter-
rence are usually regarded as indirect consequences. 1 ' Narrow
exceptions to this rule have been developed by modern case law
for outrageous defamation and invasion of privacy. 2 In cases of
personal injury, however, serious misconduct of the defendant will
not be a reason for assessing punitive damages, but will be a rea-
son for increasing the damages awarded for pain and suffering.
9 Cf. Hans Stoll, Penal Purposes in the Law of Tort, 18 AM. J. CoMP. L. 3, 8-9
(1970) (stating German tort law typically denies punitive component of damages for
injury).
10 JOSEF ESSER & JURGEN SCHMIDT, SCHULDRECHT BD. I § 30 II (6th ed. 1984);
KARL LARENZ, SCHULDRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEIL, § 27 I, at 424 (14th ed. 1987); HER-
MANN LANGE, SCHADENSERSATZ at 9 et seq. (2d ed. 1990); HANS-JOACHIm MERTENS,
DER BEGRIFF DES VERMOGENSSCHADENS iM BURGERLICHEN RECHT at 95 et seq. (1967);
WOLFGANG GRUNSKY, MUNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH,
("MiinchKomm'"), § 249 no. 3 (2d ed.); cf. Andre Tunc, Consequences of Liability Rem-
edies, XI INT. ENC. COMP. L. ch. 8, § 12, 136 (1983); 2 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KoTz,
INTRODUCTION To COMPARATIVE LAW 291 (1987).
[Tlhe law of torts deals with the cases where [citizen interests] have been
infringed, where the plaintiffs health has been impaired, his reputation
beschmirched [sic] . . . or where he has suffered some other economic loss
.... [I]t is the function of the law of tort to determine when the victim ought
to be able to shift on to the shoulders of another the harm to which he has
been exposed.
Id.; see also NORBERT HORN ET AL., GERMAN PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAw: AN INTRO-
DUCTION 146-49 (1982) (detailing legal interests protected by paragraph § 823 I of
German Civil Code ("BGB)).
11 LANGE, supra note 10, at 12 & § 7 IV 2, at 435 (concerning "Schmerzensgeld");
LARENZ, supra note 10, at 423; SOERGEL, BURGELICHES GESETZBUCH, BGB, Vor § 249
no. 27 (12th ed. Mertens 1990) (F.R.G.); ERWIN DEUTSCH, HAFrUNGSRECHT 73, 418
(1976); Stoll, supra note 9, at 9; see 2 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 20.2(B), at 401 (2d ed. 1989) (explaining limited influence of pu-
nitive damages under German tort law). But cf BERNHARD GROBFELD, DIE PRIVAT-
STRAFE, 77 (1961).
12 See Judgment of 1958, BGH (Supreme Court), 26 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 349 (F.R.G.); Judgment of 1961, BGH Gr,
35 BGHZ 363; Judgment of 1963, BGH, 39 BGHZ 124; Judgment of 1973, BVerfG
(federal constitutional court), 34 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
("BVerfGE") 269 (F.R.G.) (affirming rulings in prior BGH cases); see also Deutsch,
Das Pers6nlichkeitsrecht des Patienten, AcP 192 (1992); LANGE, supra note 10, § 7 V,
at 447 et seq. See generally Kwame Opoku, Delictual Liability in German Law, 21
INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 230, 259-69 (1972) (discussing evolution and application of right of
"personality"). But see DIETER MEDICUS, STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM BURGER-
LICHEN GESETZBUCH, § 253 note 4 (12th ed.); MUNCHKOMM 2 -GRUNsKY, § 253, at note 6.
ENFORCEMENT OF AMERICAN JUDGMENTS
The American idea of private law enforcement, which is promoted
by allowing punitive damages in addition to criminal sanctions, 13
is completely unknown to German law.
Another difference in substantive tort law, which may not be
as fundamental as the one just mentioned, but can often be the
reason for a substantially higher American award, concerns fu-
ture damages, which are often difficult to assess at the time of the
trial.14 In case of grave physical or mental injuries, it may be al-
most impossible to predict the duration of medical or psychothera-
peutic treatment and the extent to which it will be successful. In
Germany, these uncertainties are dealt with in two ways: (1) the
assessment of periodical payments, which can be altered in a new
action if the circumstances have changed considerably,' 5 and (2)
the so-called "Grundurteil," a type of judgment which declares the
defendant liable for all future damages arising from the injury' 6
and leaves determination of the actual amount to be paid to the
agreement of the parties or to future trials. By contrast, common
law demands that past and future damages arising from the same
injury be assessed at the same trial in the form of a lump sum. 17
This means that the court or the jury will have to predict the fu-
ture, and juries usually give the benefit of the doubt to the plain-
tiff.'" The case decided by the California court is a good example.
It is rather astonishing, to say the least, that there should be a
13 FLEMING, supra note 2, at 214; EDWARD J. KIONKA, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL, § 9-
3, at 371 (1992); see David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litiga-
tion, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1262-68, 1312 (1976) (addressing doctrine and function of
punitive damages).
14 KIOA, supra note 13, § 9-1, at 305; see 2 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE
AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 8:7, at 461 & n.71 (1985) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 910 and describing philosophy surrounding awards for future damages).
15 "Abiinderungsklage," § 323 ZPO (Code of Civil Procedure) [hereinafter ZPO];
see Baumbach, Lauterbach-Hartmann, Zivilprozeordnung, § 323 Anm. 2 C, D
(50th ed. 1992) [hereinafter BaumbachiLauterbach]; Zoller-Vollkommer, Zivilproze-
ordnung, § 323 no. 1, 32 (18th ed. 1993); Tunc, supra note 10, ch. 8, § 90.
16 Cf ZPO, supra note 15, § 304; see Baumbach/Lauterbach, supra, note 15, at
304 Anm. 2; ZWller, supra note 15, at 304 no. 1; Tunc, supra note 10, ch. 8, § 90.
17 Fournier v. Canadian Nat. Ry., A.C. 167 (P.C.) (1927); FLEMING, supra note 2,
at 231; IoNKA, supra note 13, at 303; Tunc, supra note 10, ch. 8, § 91; see supra note
14, § 8:7, at 461-62 (stating all past and prospective damages caused by injuries to
persons or real property must be accounted for in single action).
18 FLEMING, supra note 2, at 232; see James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr.,
Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117,
1154-65 (1984) (delineating problems surrounding punitive damage awards and es-
tablishing rationale for their abolishment).
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need for a $150,000 treatment in the future, when the past medi-
cal damages amount to only $260.19
B. Differences in Tort Litigation
Substantive law rules are not the sole reason that United
States damage awards reach greater and different financial
dimensions than those in Germany. The more important factor is
the way in which tort actions are litigated in Germany.
1. The Role of Judge and Jury
First, American tort litigation is almost exclusively conducted
by jury trial; whereas, civil law countries do not have civil juries.
In Germany, tort actions for more than petty amounts, usually
more than 10,000 DM,2 ° must be brought before a panel of three
professional judges, who are much less easily influenced than a
jury of laymen by trial lawyers' forensic fireworks and the plight of
seriously injured tort victims. That juries tend to be more gener-
ous to plaintiffs, especially when awarding future or nonpecuniary
damages, is a view expressed by several American writers21 and
shared by their European colleagues.22
2. Evidence
In the United States, civil actions are much more the private
business of the parties and their attorneys than in Germany,
where the adversary system is mitigated, or from the American
point of view, diluted, by the strong influence of the court.23
19 See, e.g., Sales & Cole, supra note 2, at 1154 ("boggle the mind").
"The flawed nature of the punitive damage doctrine is clearly evident in the total
absence of any uniformity of application. The legal rationale formulated to justify the
concept is fraught with contradictions and is totally unpredictable in its effect." Id.
20 Cf. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG) §§ 23, 71; see supra note 5, at 752-56
(discussing procedural differences in German and American litigation and describing
pervasive role of judges under German system).
21 FLEMING, supra note 2, at 224; KEETON, supra note 5, § 82, at 591; see supra
notes 18 & 19 and accompanying text. "One of the most difficult decisions facing the
jury in a personal injury action is to decide the amount of monetary award... that
the plaintiff is entitled to be awarded as compensation for past, present and future
pain and suffering.. . . "SPEImER ET AL. supra note 14, § 8:19, at 557 (quoting Graeffv.
Baptist Temple of Springfield, 576 S.W.2d 291, 301-02 (Mo. 1978)).
22 Stiefel & Stiirner, supra note 4, at 835; Schiitze, supra note 4, at 392.
23 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. See generally David J. Gerber, Ex-
traterritorial Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural Systems: Germany and the
United States, 34 AM. J. CoMP. L. 745, 752 et seq. (1986).
[Vol. 68:199
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The distinction begins with the way in which evidence is pro-
cured. In Germany, there is no "pretrial discovery." On the con-
trary, the American system of searching for evidence is strongly
resented,24 and this is an important reason why the Hague Evi-
dence Convention does not work between the United States and
most European countries.25 In German civil litigation, the parties
must indicate in their pleadings the evidence relied upon to prove
their allegations. Except for documents in their own possession,
parties are not obliged to produce that evidence at the trial. Wit-
ness coaching by the parties' lawyers is considered a violation of
professional ethics rules.26 Expert witnesses are called by the
court 27 and not the parties, and are supposed to be impartial.28 If
an expert shows any sign of bias, the adversely affected party can
request that the expert be replaced. At the trial, real cross-exami-
nations are rare. Usually the interrogation is done by the judges,
and the parties' lawyers are only allowed to ask additional ques-
tions.29 Expert witnesses ordinarily submit their testimony in
writing and are only called for personal appearance at the trial if
the court or one of the parties believes that further questioning
24 Rolf A. Schutze, Zur Verteidigunq im Beweiserhebungsverfahren in U.S.- Amer-
ikanisehen Zivilprozessen, WM (WERTPAPIERMITrEILUNGEN) 633 (1986); HAImo
SCHACK, EINF0HRUNG IN DAS U.S.-ANEKANISCHE ZIVLPROZERECHT 40 (1988); see
supra note 5 and accompanying text. "[One major] conflict has centered on one main
area of difference between the German and American systems-the protection of busi-
ness information." Id. at 764 (footnote omitted). See generally Symposium, Compel-
ling Discovery in Transnational Litigation, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 957 (1984).
25 Rolf Sterner, Rechtshilfe nach dem Haager Beweisiibereinkommen fir Com-
mon Law-Linder (1981); Stiefel & Stfzrner, supra note 4, at 830; Gerber, supra note
23, at 779; Abbo Junker, Discovery im Deutsch-Amerikanischen Rechtshilfeverkehr
(1986); see supra note 5, at 747. "[Tlhe preparation and operation of an international
treaty on evidence-taling, the Hague Evidence Convention, has led to misunder-
standings and unfulfilled expectations on both [American and European] sides." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
26 See Wilhelm C. Feuerich, Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung, § 43 no. 76 (2d ed.
1992); supra note 8, at 1200-01 (describing attorney's limited access to witnesses due
to stringent ethical standard). "A witness, as distinguished from an expert, will not
be heard in ordinary litigation unless nominated by a party .... [Only the court can
call nominated witnesses and it exercises a discretion as to order and number." Id. at
1233 (footnotes omitted).
27 See supra note 15, § 404 ZPO; see Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1242-43 (describing
status and treatment of experts under German civil system).
28 LEO ROSENBERG & KARL HEINz ScHWAB, ZiMLPROZEREcHT, § 124 at 762-67
(14th ed. 1986); see Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1243, "In German courts, it would be
hard to find... anything resembling American-style clashes between experts paid to
be partial.... ")
29 Supra note 15, § 397 ZPO; see Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1234-35 (illustrating
interrogation of witnesses under German civil procedure).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
might be necessary. 0 The neutrality of expert witnesses ensures a
more realistic appraisal of damages in personal injury cases.
Americans may argue that in the adversary system the same re-
sult can be reached because when there are big differences be-
tween the experts for the plaintiff and for the defendant, the jury's
assessment will come out somewhere in the middle. This result,
however, is far from certain in cases in which sympathy for the
plaintiff or anger at the defendant's tortious conduct is strong, or
the defendant is a corporation with a "deep pocket." 1 In general,
the appraisal of an impartial expert is more rational and less emo-
tional than that of a jury.
3. Legal Costs
Third, the rules on what can be charged as legal costs and
who must bear those costs differ significantly in the United States
and Germany. According to German law and to the law of other
European countries (including England), the losing party must
pay the court fees and reimburse the attorney's fees of the win-
ning party.2 Due to these procedural regulations, legal costs are
completely separated from the question of damages and have no
influence over their assessment. In America, the traditional rule
is against such fee-shifting.3 3 Nevertheless, juries know that the
plaintiff will have to pay his attorney's fees from his damages, and
30 See ROSENBERG & ScHwAB, supra note 28, at 770; Kaplan, supra note 8, at
1243. "Generally an expert will submit a written opinion in advance and will then
appear and be questioned on it .... A written opinion alone may be received, but a
party can still require that the expert appear and defend it." Id. (footnote omitted).
31 See FLEMING, supra note 2, at 111-24; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 24-25 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that courts will
factor relative ability of parties to bear loss into their decisions).
32 § 91 ZPO. BGHZ 60, 337, 343 (1973); FLEMING, supra note 2, at 187; Susan
Gluck Mezey & Susan M. Olson, Fee Shifting and Public Policy: The Equal Justice
Act, 77 JUDICATURE 13 (1993) (describing English rule as "whoever-loses-pays"); Wer-
ner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PRoBs. 37, 45-46 (1984); John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee
Allocation: The Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1567 (1993);
James D. Weiss, Note, Nominal Damages, Nominal Victory, Estate of Farrar v. Cain's
Improper Limit on Awards of Attorneys' Fees Under § 1988, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1251
(1992); Herbert M. Kritzer, Legal Fees-The English Rule, 78 A.B.A. J. 54 (1992);
Snyder & Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts
Theory, 6 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 345 (1990); Marshall J. Berger, Compensation Formulas
For Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249 (1984).
33 See Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) ("Ameri-
can rule" accredited); FLEMING, supra note 2, at 188; see also Vargo, supra note 32.
[Vol. 68:199
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so damages will often be increased accordingly.3 4 In the afore-
mentioned California case, the judgment expressly ordered that
40% of the damages paid by the defendant be kept by the plain-
tiffs attorney. The different ways the plaintiff is reimbursed for
his legal costs could be considered a mere technical difference if
the plaintiff's attorney's fees were not disproportionately higher in
American than in German tort litigation and, hence, did not pro-
portionately drive up damage award. In Germany, lawyers' fees
are related to the amount of the claim, but in a regressive way, so
that with an increase of the claim, the fees will rise too, but not to
the same degree. 5 For instance, if the claim is for 100,000 DM, the
attorney's fee will be 5667 DM, but if the claim is for one million
DM, the fee will be 17,367 DM.36 These fees are fixed by statutory
regulation. Fee arrangements are permitted 3 7 but they are unu-
sual in civil cases. Contingent fees, the darling of plaintiffs' law-
yers in the United States, are not allowed by German law.3 8 One
34 Owen, supra note 13, at 1297 (compensating tort victim generously, offsets
American rule); Stiefel & Stiirner, supra note 4, at 831. Contra Joachim Zekoll, Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of American Products Liability Awards in the Federal Re-
public of Germany, 37 AAi. J. Cosip. L. 301, 320 (1989) (suggesting excessive awards
be reduced prior to enforcement); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical
Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 1269 (1993); Alan H. Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages,
the Seventh Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 167
(1991).
35 Cf. Benjamin Kaplan et al., Phases of German Civil Procedure I, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 1443, 1461-67 (1958) (increasing award results in decreasing percentage re-
ceived by attorney); Suhr, Legal Fees in Germany, Ir'L BAR J., May 1979, at 18; ROLF
BENDER & CHRISTOPH STRECKER, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 530 (Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant
Garth eds. Vol. I Book IE, 1978) (determining costs on basis of amount in controversy
and statutory requirements as opposed to degree of work); Pfennigstorf, supra note
32, at 56 (1984); Lawrence W. Newman & Michael Burrows, 'Loser Pays'--Attorneys'
Fees in England, Germany, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1993, at 3; D. LuBAN, LAWYERs AND
JUSTICE: AN ETHmCAL STUDY 97 (1988).
36 See § 11 1 Bundesgebiihrenordnung fir Rechtsanwdlte [hereinafter "BRAGO"]
(tables); Jiirgen F. Ernst, AmVALTSGEBOHEEN (2d ed. 1991); The base fee for a
100,000 DM dispute is 1889 DM charged once for drafting and filing a complaint, once
for participation in an oral hearing, and once for participation in taking evidence for a
total of 5667 DM. Newman & Burrows, supra note 35. This base fee may also be
charged for participation in negotiated settlement and further costs may be charged
for appeals. Id.
37 See § 3 BRAGO; Ernst, supra note 36, at 125 et seq.; see also Newman & Bur-
rows, supra note 35 (stating that different arrangements are possible under different
circumstances, although it is violation of code of ethics to arrange for fees lower than
statute).
38 Cf BGHZ 34, 64, 71 (1960); Feuerich, supra note 26, § 43 no. 194; Laurel S.
Terry, An Introduction to the European Community's Legal Ethics Code Part I: An
Analysis of the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, n.127 and accompa-
1994]
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can easily see that the fixed fees just mentioned are negligible
compared with the 30% or 40% contingency fee an American law-
yer might receive, and that damage awards which include such
costs look excessive from the German point of view.
III. ARGUMENTS FOR REFUSING RECOGNITION IN GERMANY
The recognition of foreign judgments in Germany is regulated
by section 328 of the Code of Civil Procedure ("ZPO").3 9 The gen-
eral rule is that, if the trial court had jurisdiction and the defend-
ant was duly served and due process met, the judgment will be
recognized 4° unless it is obviously incompatible with fundamental
principles of German law-meaning that it does not violate Ger-
man public policy.4 1 The question then is whether American dam-
nying text (1993); Allison F. Aranson, Note, The United States Percentage Contingent
Fee System: Ridicule and Reform from an International Perspective, 27 TEX. INTL L.J.
755 n.24 (1992) (noting partial exceptions allowed); Joachim Zekoll, The Enforceabil-
ity of American Money Judgments Abroad: A Landmark Decision by the German Fed-
eral Court of Justice, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 641, 672 n.57 and accompanying
text (1992) (contingent fees void as violation of public policy); John C. Reitz, Why We
Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 IowA L. REV.
987 (1990); Werner F. Ebke, In Search of Alternatives: Comparative Reflections on
Corporate Governance and the Independent Auditor's Responsibilities, 79 Nw. U. L.
REV. 663 (1984).
39 There are no treaties or conventions on recognition of judgments between the
United States and Germany. The Hague Convention, on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, dated February 1,
1971, is in force, but has been ratified by neither the United States nor Germany; Joel
R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INV'L L.J. 1 (1991); David Westin,
Enforcing Foreign Commercial Judgments and Arbitral Awards in the United States,
West Germany, and England, 19 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 325 (1987); Michael Gruson
and Michael Kutschera, Opinion of Counsel on Agreements Governed by Foreign Law,
19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 515, n.23 and accompanying text (1986); cf INFoRMATIONS
DIVERSES, REvUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PrIvE [R.C.D.I.P.], 82, 187
(1993).
40 See ROSENBERG & SCHWAB, supra note 28, § 158 at 999 et seq. For other barri-
ers to recognition, such as conflicting judgments or lack of reciprocity, see Dieter Mar-
tiny, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 721, 743-44, 749-52 (1987); Zekoll, supra note 34,
at 305; Zekoll, supra note 38, nn.18-24 and accompanying text; Rick Monte Reznic-
sek, Note, International Environmental Bankruptcy: An Overview of Environmental
Bankruptcy Law, Including A State's Claims Against the Multinational Polluter, 23
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 345, nn.291-93 and accompanying text (1990); Otto Sandrock,
Prejudgment Attachments: Securing International Loans or Other Claims for Money,
21 INT'L LAw. 1, 24 n.83 (1987).
41 Cf. Martiny, supra note 40, at 744-45 (recognizing judgment unless basic no-
tions of justice violated); Zekoll, supra note 34, at 311 et seq. (recognizing judgments
unless incompatible with fundamental German principles); HAimo ScHACK, INTERNA-
TIONALES ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHT 314 (1991).
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age awards, which for the aforementioned reasons are considera-
bly higher than those of German courts, violate fundamental
principles, and what exactly those principles are in Germany.
A. Public Policy: German International Tort Law
Several Germany writers have proposed a seemingly easy
way to adjust American tort judgments to come down to German
damages proportions.42 According to a provision in the Introduc-
tory Law to the German Civil Code,43 a German defendant cannot
be held liable for claims exceeding those that would be justified
under German law even if foreign tort law is applicable. This is a
special rule of public policy, and it has been argued that it should
be regarded not only as a choice-of-law rule, but also as a defense
to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
Although this solution would have the advantage of making the
chances of recognition predictable and of deterring forum shop-
ping, the BGH has rejected it because it is too rigid and
inflexible.
The proposed rule does not allow the relationship of the
wrongful conduct to other states to be taken into account. This
deficiency is particularly obvious in the case at hand, which was
closely connected with California. Both parties were domiciled
there as U.S. citizens, the tort was committed in California, and
the connection to Germany was rather weak-only the defend-
ant's cumulative German citizenship. Certainly, defendant does
not deserve the protection of German law simply because he re-
turned to Germany after the wrong or because his property is situ-
ated there. Incidentally, the German conflicts provision protect-
ing German defendants simply on account of their nationality has
long been criticized for its nationalistic approach. It does not fit
into modern conflicts law,45 and a rule of such dubious character
42 HAnIo SCHACK, ART. 12 EGBGB IM DEUTSCHEN ANERKENNUNGS-UND
REQREVERFAHREN, VersR 422, 424 (1984); ScclAK, supra note 41, at 869; Schutze,
supra note 4, at 400; MiinchKomm2-Kreuzer, Art. 38 EGBGB Rn. 318. But see Mar-
tiny, supra note 40, at 746 (using public policy to favor Germans in tort cases is un-
just); Zekoll, supra note 34, at 314-17 et seq.
43 Art. 38 EGBGB (revising Art. 12 EGBGB).
44 Supra note 6, at 3100 et seq.
45 See Palandt-Heldrich, Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, Art. 38 EGBGB, no. 28 (52d
ed. 1993); CaiSTvN V. BAR, INTERNATIONALES PRiVATRECHT, no. 679 et seq. (Bd. 2,
1991); KREZER, MoNcHKOAmiz 2, Art. 38 EGBGB, no. 306; Gerhard Kegel, INTERNA-
TioNALES PRWvATREcHT, 469 (6th ed. 1987); Zekoll, supra note 38, at 654 n.56 and
accompanying text.
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should not be applied by analogy to the recognition of foreign
judgments.
B. Public Policy: Differences in Tort Litigation
When American damage awards are so much higher than
German ones mainly because of fundamental differences in tort
litigation, one might expect that the public policy defense would
be based on this point. However, German courts, as well as writ-
ers, have been extremely cautious to deny recognition because of
procedural differences,46 and this has been confirmed by the BGH
in the California case.
The court has expressly rejected the argument that pretrial
discovery as such should be regarded as contrary to German pub-
lic policy.47 It will tolerate this way of uncovering evidence, unless
its concrete results are obviously incompatible with German no-
tions of judicial fact-finding, taking into account whether there
have been interferences with German sovereignty.48
As far as the considerable differences in legal costs are con-
cerned, it has been settled by several earlier decisions that the
German prohibition of contingent fees does not apply with equal
rigor to agreements with lawyers in foreign or international litiga-
tion.49 The courts may reduce the scale if it is regarded as exces-
sive even by generous European standards. Whether there is an
obvious excess will be judged by taking into account the difficulty
and complexity of the case, as well as the lawyer's expenses in
time and money; for example, when the lawyer's activity consisted
of no more than some correspondence and the timely application
for a rather undisputed claim, the scale was reduced from 35% to
20%,5° which was still four times as high as the fee of a German
lawyer. In the California case, the BGH saw no reason to reduce
the 40% fee included in the damages award because the California
court had expressly considered it as reasonable in view of the com-
46 See BGHZ 53, 357, 363 (1970) ("Prohibition of revision au fond"); Schutze, Deu-
tsches Internationales Zivilprozerecht, 160 et seq. (1985); Martiny, supra note 40, at
748.
47 Schiitze, supra note 4, at 401; see Zekoll, supra note 38 (stating that pretrial
discovery should not pose problem in enforcement proceedings).
48 Supra note 6; see Stiefel & Stirner, supra note 4, at 830.
49 See BGHZ 22, 162, 164 (1956), 44, 183, 187 (1965); Alan A. Paterson, Contin-
gent Fees and Their Rivals, 1989 ScoTs L. TIMEs 81, 81 (discussing exceptions to Ger-
man rules prohibiting contingency arrangements).
50 BGHZ 44, 183, 191 (1965).
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plexity and difficulty of the case.5 ' It seems that the court which is
asked to recognize the fee should not re-examine the issue if the
original court has already dealt with it.
It has also been argued that the American rule against fee
shifting should preclude recognition if a German defendant has
not entered an appearance because the cost of winning would have
been too high.52 However, it cannot and must not be the purpose
of the fee recognition procedure to relitigate the original suit just
to see who would have won.53 Furthermore, the German Supreme
Court has observed that there is good reason for the American
rule insofar as it facilitates access to justice5 4 because the plain-
tiffs cost risks are lower. For these reasons, the cost rule will not
be regarded as a valid objection to recognition except for frivolous
or abusive suits, for which many American states seem to have
fee-shifting rules as well.55 Finally, after having expressed some
doubts about the impartiality of juries in certain types of tort
cases, I must say that the jury trial, as such, has never been con-
sidered as a possible violation of German public policy. As a re-
sult, even though the much higher American damage award is to a
large extent due to procedural differences, these differences will
usually not constitute a reason for denying recognition.
51 See supra note 6, at 3101.
52 Cf. Schiitze, WM 1979, 1174, 1176. But cf. Zekoll, supra note 34, at 322-23
(bearing one's own expenses entices attorneys to accept contingency fees thereby al-
lowing indigent parties to sue).
53 See Stiefel & Stiirner, supra note 4, at 831; see also FLEMING, supra note 2, at
192.
54 Supra note 6, at 3099. For a neutral evaluation of the rule, see FLEMING, supra
note 2, at 192 et seq.
55 See Raymond A. Nolan, Comment, Ohio's Frivolous Conduct Statute: A Need
for Stronger Deterrence, 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 261 (1992); Gregory A. Hicks, Statutory
Damage Caps Are an Incomplete Reform: A Proposal for Attorney Fee Shifting in Tort
Actions, 49 LA. L. REV. 763, 788 n.84, 789 n.88, 798 nn.124-26, 799-800 nn.130-33 and
accompanying text (1989); Valmer L. Johnson, Comment, The Award of Attorneys'
Fees to Prevailing Defendants Under Washington's Long Arm Statute, 63 WASH. L.
REv. 125, 125 (1988); Jeffrey A. Parness, Choices About Attorney Fee-Shifting Laws:
Further Substance/Procedure Problems Under Erie and Elsewhere, 49 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 393, 394 nn.3 & 5, 422 n.147 and accompanying text (1988); Symposium, State
Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes:Are We Quietly Repealing the American Rule ?, 47 LAw
& CON MP. PaOBS. 321 (1984); Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees for Abuses of
the Judicial System, 61 N.C. L. REv. 613 (1983); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal
Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651 (1982); cf
Stiefel & Stirner, supra note 4, at 831 n.31.
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C. Public Policy: Differences in Substantive Tort Law
As stated above, recognition of a foreign judgment will be
granted unless an award is regarded as excessive in light of funda-
mental principles of substantive German tort law. At this point, I
will return to my earlier remark that the primary purpose of Ger-
man tort rules is compensation. Punishment and deterrence are
no more than indirect effects, which as a rule do not justify non-
compensatory damages.
1. Punitive Damages
It is obvious that the purpose of punitive damages contrasts
sharply with the German purpose of compensation. The primary
object of such damages is punishment and deterrence, 6 and their
size may be influenced more by interests of the general public
than by those of the immediate parties. This, according to Ger-
man notions, is the domain of penal, not private, law. For these
reasons, the German Supreme Court has held punitive damages
to be incompatible with fundamental German tort principles, and
therefore barred punitive damages from recognition and enforce-
ment in Germany.5 7
Of course, exemplary and punitive damages may occasionally
serve as compensation for nonpecuniary detriments, economic
losses that are difficult to prove, or costs and expenses not covered
by other parts of the damage award. In these situations, they cer-
tainly do not violate public policy and should not be excluded from
recognition. The problem is whether this can be detected from
56 Cf Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 87 (1896); Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic
Church of Sacred Hearts of Jesus & Mary, 186 N.E. 798 (N.Y. 1933) (deterring future
torts achieved through punishment); FLEMING, supra note 2, at 214; Kionka, supra
note 13, § 9-3, at 371; KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 9 (deterring others by punishing
offender); Sales & Cole, supra note 2, at 1126-29 (punishing and determining main
objectives); Owen, supra note 13, at 1277-95 (punishing and deterring primary pur-
pose of punitive damages); Zekoll, supra note 34, at 324-30 (punishing and deterring
inherent in punitive damages); Jonathan Kagan, Comment, Toward a Uniform Ap-
plication of Punishment: Using the Federal Sentencing Guidelines As a Model for Pu-
nitive Damage Reform, 40 UCLA L. REv. 753 (1993); Eileen R. Kaufman, Punitive
Damages in Section 1983 Cases, 449 PL/LIT 445 (1992); Philip H. Corboy, Vicarious
Liability for Punitive Damages: The Effort to Constitutionalize "Tort Reform," 2 SE-
TON HALL CONST. L.J. 5, n.5 and accompanying text (1991).
57 Supra note 6, at 3104.
58 BGH, supra note 6, at 3103; cf Stiefel & Sturner, supra note 4, at 841; Zekoll,
supra note 34, at 330 (recognizing compensatory components of award not barred);
Siehr, Vollstreckunq ausldndischer Verurteilunqen zu "punitive damaqes" RIW 705,
709 (1991).
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the original judgment. The judgment of the California court al-
lowed no such inference, as nonpecuniary detriments were al-
ready covered by the generous damage award of $200,000 for pain
and suffering, and the lawyer's fees were also included in all other
parts of the award. Under these circumstances, there were no
compensatory elements to be detected in the punitive damages
that might allow at least partial recognition. One might argue
that asking the plaintiff to demonstrate such compensatory as-
pects amounts to partial relitigation of the first suit. That idea
has not come to the BGH, and I think it is right. Given the pri-
mary purpose of punitive damages in American law, there is
something of a presumption that they are not compensatory, and
it must be for the plaintiff requesting recognition to overcome this
presumption.5 9
2. Future Damages and Damages for Pain and Suffering
At first glance, the recognition of awards for future damages
or damages for pain and suffering seems to be much easier than
the problem of punitive damages. Both American and German
law share the same purpose-compensation. Provided that only
the ways by which they achieve this purpose differ, there will be
no obvious public policy conflicts. Therefore, the German
Supreme Court has, on both counts, been rather generous towards
the California award. It allowed the recovery of damages for fu-
ture medical treatment, even though the plaintiff had no intention
to undergo the treatment, which is contrary to the rules that this
same court rather recently established for German tort law.60
Furthermore, the extraordinary amount of the awards, at least by
German standards, has not been regarded by the court as suffi-
cient reason for limiting recognition to a reduced amount.61
At this point, however, one must bear in mind the special cir-
cumstances of the case at hand. As previously noted, both the tor-
tious conduct and the parties involved in the case had strong con-
tacts with the United States and rather weak ones with Germany.
This explains the rather liberal attitude toward the enormity of
59 See Pacific Mutual Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1037 n.1 (1991); Rustad
& Koenig, supra note 34; Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Symposium, Puni-
tive Damages Reform-State Legislatures Can and Should Meet the Challenge Issued
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Haslip, 42 Ai. U. L. REV. 1365 (1993); cf.
Reinhold Geimer, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZERECHT, no. 2974 (2d ed. 1993).
60 See BGHZ 97, 14, 19 (1986).
61 But cf Deutsch, JZ 266-67 (1993).
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the damages. When contacts with Germany are stronger, such as
in products liability suits against German manufacturers, it is im-
probable that a tort judgment would be recognized without limita-
tion if the award were of disproportionate size according to Ger-
man tort standards. German law adheres to the principle of
proportionality ("Grundsatz der VerhaltnismaBigkeit"), which is
regarded as a constitutional rule.62 Its effect on tort law is that
compensation must be proportionate to the loss,6 3 and the closer
the connections with Germany, the more domestic public policy
requires 64 that this principle be observed by a foreign judgment.
Such a rule, of course, is rather vague and opens the door to more
questions than answers. It does not set forth the types of contacts
that will be taken into consideration and to what extent higher
amounts will be tolerated. That is, however, the problem of all
public policy rules in conflicts law.
CONCLUSION
Since the purpose of recognition of foreign judgments is to
avoid double litigation on the same issue, it is insufficient that the
American award simply exceed an amount that would be assessed
by the German court; it obviously must be much higher. Taking
into account that living in the United States is more expensive
anyway, reduction should not be considered unless the award is at
minimum two to three times as high as a German one. 65
As for the domestic contacts that might justify a reduction,
they depend on the sort of wrong committed. Persons who have
committed an intentional tort in a foreign country do not deserve
as much protection as those held liable for negligence or strict lia-
bility. In the latter case, the question of insurability will be of
great importance.66 If a defendant has his domicile, permanent
residence, or place of business in Germany, then the German
62 BVerfGE 19, 342, 348 (1965), 35, 202, 221 (1973); Steven A. Bibas, Comment,
The European Court of Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court: Parallels in Fundamen-
tal Rights Jurisprudence, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. Rev. 253 (1992).
63 BGH, supra note 6, at 3104; see Zekoll, supra note 38, at 652 nn.48 & 49 and
accompanying text.
64 See Staudinger v. Hoffmann, Art. 38 EGE3GB no. 249.
65 See Stiefel & Stiirner, supra note 4, at 840. See Zekoll, supra note 38 (noting
Germans' highest court's statement that proportionality test must account for ab-
sence of contacts with Germany and give greater deference toward foreign
judgments).
66 See FLEMING, supra note 2, at 21, 221 et seq.; Stiefel & Stiirner, supra note 4, at
835; Kionka, supra note 13, at 375 et seq.; KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 584 et seq.
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courts should, and I believe will, protect him or her from damage
awards that are so excessive that they cannot be covered by insur-
ance at a reasonable price.
One may think that this last view is rather nationalistic. It
should first be noted that the enormity of United States damage
awards has also been criticized by distinguished American writ-
ers.6 7 Furthermore, I am, of course, interested in not being held
liable for extremely high damages if I cause economic loss to some-
one who relies on an erroneous remark that I may have made in
this Article.
67 FLEMING, supra note 2, at 220 et seq.; KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 11 et seq.;
Sales & Cole, supra note 2, at 1154 et seq.; Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Sharon G. Burrows, Comment, Apportioning a Piece of a Punitive Damage
Award to the State: Can State Extraction Statutes Be Reconciled With Punitive Dam-
age Goals and the Takings Clause, 47 U. MIAMn L. REV. 437, n.3 and accompanying
text (1992); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Dam-
ages, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1990); Neil J. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort
Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 55-56, 61 (1990).
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